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"They wanted to know why I did what I did Well, Sir, I guess there'sjust
a meanness in this world. ",
I. INTRODUCTION
The psychopath is a character who frequently appears in the academic
literature on responsibility theory.2 He poses a difficult challenge for various
accounts of the capacities required for appropriate ascriptions of moral and
legal responsibility. As he is often described, the psychopath has the capacity
to reason practically (he suffers no delusions about the physical world, can
pursue the means to his ends, has an effective will, etc.); but he appears to
lack the capacity to grasp and control his behavior in light of distinctly moral
considerations. He is constitutionally void of empathy and incurably blind to
reasons to treat others in morally acceptable ways. As portrayed, then, the
psychopath resides in the area of disagreement between two sets of moral
responsibility theorists: (i) theorists who put forth the general capacity for
practical reasoning or rational self-governance as sufficient for an agent to be
appropriately held morally responsible for his conduct,3 and (ii) theorists
who view that general capacity as necessary but not sufficient for moral
responsibility, additionally requiring the capacity to grasp and respond to
1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Nebraska, on NEBRASKA (Columbia 1982) (sung from the
perspective of Charles Starkweather who went on a killing spree, murdering eleven people, in
the late 1950's).
2. See HERBERT FINGARETTE, ON RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1967); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER &
MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBLITY 78
(1998); JONATHAN GLOVER, RESPONSIBILITY 137-38 (Ted Honderich ed., 1970); R. JAY
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 177-78 (1994); Piers Benn,
Freedom, Resentment, and the Psychopath, 6 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 29, 30 (1999);
John Deigh, Empathy and Universalizability, 105 ETHICS 743, 745 (1995); Antony Duff,
Psychopathy and Moral Understanding, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 189, 190 (1977); Ishtiyaque Haji, On
Psychopaths and Culpability, 17 LAW & PHIL. 117, 117 (1998); Vinit Haksar, The
Responsibility of Psychopaths, 15 PHIL. Q. 135, 135 (1965); Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation
and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114, 123 (William C. Heffernan &
John Kleinig, eds., 2000) [hereinafter Morse, Deprivation]; Stephen J. Morse, Reason,
Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 375-76; Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 289 (1972); Michael S.
Pritchard, Responsibility, Understanding, and Psychopathology, 58 THE MONIST 630, 631
(1974).
3. See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 280 (1998).
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distinctly moral reasons.4 On the former view, we may appropriately hold
psychopaths responsible for their wrongful actions, but not on the latter.
This Article addresses this debate about the capacities required for moral
responsibility and the moral responsibility status of persons with
psychopathy. My aim is not to describe the opposing views and argue why
one is more persuasive than the other. Rather, I propose to deflate the debate
as far as possible, attempting to reduce the area of disagreement between the
two camps. Meaningful disagreement exists only if there are, or could be,
agents who have an undiminished capacity for practical reasoning or rational
self-governance, yet truly are incapable of grasping and acting on moral
reasons. However, I suggest that the capacity for rational self-governance
entails the capacity to comprehend and act on moral considerations; thus, to
the extent that an individual truly is incapable of grasping moral reasons, we
should expect to find deeper, more general deficiencies in that individual's
rational capacities. I appeal to the work of leading researchers who study
individuals with psychopathy to determine whether the latter do represent
rational self-governors without the capacity to grasp and apply moral
considerations. I argue, though, that the researchers' accounts of
psychopathic individuals strongly suggests that the psychopath's incapacity
for moral reasoning is, indeed, evidence of more general deficits in the
rational capacities required for fully accountable agency.
In Part II, I discuss the relevant opposing views on the capacities
required for appropriate ascriptions of moral responsibility, with particular
focus on the underlying bases for the disagreement. In Part III, I ask whether
agents exist who fall into the area of disagreement between these views, and
then briefly consider whether any such agents are conceivable. I introduce
the psychopath, based on the psychological literature, in Part IV, explaining
why he appears to be a candidate for the area of disagreement. Then, in Part
V, I argue that the psychological literature supports the hypothesis that the
psychopath's incapacity for moral reasoning is symptomatic of deeper
incapacities of rationality. My closing remarks in Part VI sketch relevant
considerations for thinking about practical implications for criminal law.
4. See, e.g., FISCHER & RAvIzzA, supra note 2, at 76-81; WALLACE, supra note 2, at
154-55; SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 87-88 (1990).
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II. CAPACITIES REQUIRED FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Disagreement and its Basis
Responsibility requires control. An agent whom we may appropriately
hold responsible has a certain kind of control over what she does. But what
kind of control is required? On one traditional view, control requires the
ability to act otherwise.5 An agent exercises the requisite control over an
action and thus is responsible for it only if she truly had alternative
possibilities for action at the time.
This intuitive conception of control raises the classic debates regarding
whether moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism, given
that the latter seemingly precludes the possibility of alternative possibilities.6
The truth of causal determinism implies that every event that occurs is
causally determined, given the state of the world at any prior time and
holding fixed the physical laws of nature.7 If each event (including human
acts, deliberations, choices, etc.) is causally determined, then we seemingly
never have the ability to do other than what we actually do.8 There are no
forks in the proverbial road: our intentions, choices, and actions were
determined before we were born. This threat to responsibility posed by
determinism has, of course, spawned a fascinating literature on how we
should understand the "alternative possibilities" conception of control and
other related questions about free will.
However, many theorists who defend the compatibility of our ascriptions
of moral responsibility and causal determinism endorse a different
conception of control, one that does not require alternative possibilities. On
one such compatibilist view-the "reasons-responsive" approach-the
general capacity that persons possess in virtue of which they may be held
morally responsible is the capacity to act for and respond to reasons. 9
5. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Introduction to PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 33-34 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993).
6. For an excellent introduction to these debates, see generally ROBERT KANE, A
CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO FREE WILL (2005).
7. John Martin Fischer, Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, 110 ETHICS 93, 99-100
(1999).
8. T.M. Scanlon rightfully points out that "our moral ideas also seem to be threatened
by a weaker claim," which he labels the "Causal Thesis." SCANLON, supra note 3, at 250. He
states that "all of our actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws
of the kind that govern other events in the universe, whether these laws are deterministic or
merely probabilistic." Id. (emphasis added).
9. Fischer, supra note 7, at 127.
[Vol. 39:349
HeinOnline  -- 39 Rutgers L.J. 352 2007-2008
RESPONSIBILITY STATUS OF THE PSYCHOPATH
Regardless of whether our actions, choices, or even our reasoning processes
are causally determined, the important distinction between responsible and
non-responsible agents is not that the former alone have some ability to step
outside the causal forces of the universe, but rather that they have the
capacity to reason practically. 10 We exempt the insane from moral and legal
obligations, not because their conduct is caused, but because they are
irrational. 11
A related compatibilist strategy is to cast the fundamental requirement of
responsible agency in terms of the capacity of persons to act in accordance
with their deeply held values12 or, using Harry Frankfurt's terms, their
higher-order desires about the kinds of persons they want to be. 13 Persons,
distinct from other animals, do not merely act on unevaluated desires and
urges, but have the capacity to step back and assess their first-order desires
as good or bad, choiceworthy or not, noble or base, etc. 14 A person may have
a first-order desire to smoke a cigarette, but may also judge that desire
unworthy to satisfy. (Or, again in Frankfurt's terms, she may have a second-
order desire not to have or act upon that first-order desire). 15 On these
"hierarchical views" about what is distinctive about persons, an agent acts of
her own free will when she acts in accordance with her higher-order desires
10. The law conceives responsible agents as practical reasoners, not as agents who are
uncaused causers-agents who act outside the causal forces of the universe. MICHAEL S.
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 44-112 (1984); Stephen J.
Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 251, 252-53 (2000).
11. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defense: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 329, 339 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
Thus, for our purposes, it is not important to go into detail into the ultimate causes of
psychopathy, including biological causes. With regard to assessing an agent's responsibility
status, our focus must be on the agent's rational capacities. Accord Duff, supra note 2, at 191
(arguing that the presence of physiological abnormalities does not imply any rational
incapacities; such abnormalities could provide evidence of rational incapacities if they were
correlated with the latter).
12. This view is also referred to as the "real self' or "self-disclosure" view, in that it
maintains that a person is responsible for her actions that express her commitments. Gary
Watson, Two Faces of Responsibility, 24 PHIL. Topics 227 (1996), reprinted in GARY
WATSON, AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 260-61 (2004); see also Fischer,
supra note 7, at 125-27 (discussing such views, though calling them "identification
approaches").
13. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J.
PHIL. 5, 6-7 (1971), reprinted in HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE
ABOUT 11, 12-14 (1988).
14. See id.; see also Charles Taylor, Responsibility for Self, in THE IDENTITIES OF
PERSONS 281, 282-85 (Amdlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976).
15. Frankfurt, supra note 13, at 6-7.
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or values.16 Determinism does not undermine free will on this account: even
if determinism is true, there is a distinction between our actions that accord
with our higher-order desires and those that do not. One might argue, then,
that a person is responsible for acts of her own free will, as that term is
defined on this account.
More plausibly, though, one might argue that responsibility requires the
capacity to have acted in accordance with one's higher-order desires or
deeply-held values, and not necessarily that one did act in accordance with
them. That we sometimes are weak-willed yet remain responsible for such
moments of weakness supports this more plausible formulation. When I am
weak-willed and eat that extra-large piece of chocolate cake despite the fact
that I do not want my first-order desire for the cake to be motivationally
effective (I have a higher-order desire to stay healthy), I may not be acting
freely on the hierarchical account of free will. However, the fact that I acted
with a weak will does not seem to undermine the judgment that I am and
should hold myself responsible for acting on my first-order desire for the
cake, given that I had the capacity to refrain.
Now, one might raise an objection to both the reasons-responsive and
hierarchical compatibilist accounts of the requirements for moral
responsibility: That is, an agent might have the capacity to respond to
reasons, or conform her will to her values, yet lack the distinct capacity to act
for moral reasons or have the right moral values. For example, Susan Wolf
rejects hierarchical views, arguing that an agent may act in accordance with
his deeply-held values yet lack the capacity to live according to the right
values. 17 An agent may be responsible in a superficial sense if his act reflects
his values (or, his "true self'); but holding an agent responsible, particularly
for a wrongful act, has a distinct significance or special depth, according to
Wolf.'8 To blame is to judge the "moral quality of the individual herself...
[in a] seemingly more serious way."'19 Because of the seriousness and
implications attached to blaming someone, Wolf argues that someone who is
incapable of endorsing and acting in conformity with morally right values
does not deserve blame (i.e., may not be held morally responsible for
16. Id. at 13-15.
17. WOLF, supra note 4, at 117.
18. Id. at40-41.
19. Id. at 41.
[Vol. 39:349
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wrongdoing), even if that agent's acts reflect his true self or higher-order
desires.20
For reasons similar to Wolf s, Jay Wallace includes the capacity to grasp
and respond to distinctly moral reasons in his reasons-responsive account of
responsibility.21 Building on Strawson,22 Wallace argues that our practice of
holding each other to moral obligations exposes persons to the risk of moral
blame and its expression through moral sanctioning behavior, such as
censure, rebuke, and punishment.23 This possibility of moral sanction
requires that we hold morally responsible only those agents whom it is fair to
24hold to moral obligations. Wallace argues that it is unfair, or unreasonable,
to hold an agent responsible unless she has the capacity to grasp and apply
the moral reasons that support and can motivate compliance with such
obligations.25
Stephen Morse endorses Wallace's account of the interpersonal
significance of holding agents morally responsible and that fairness must
guide our inquiry into the capacities required for responsibility.26 Morse
concludes that beyond the capacity to reason practically, accountable agents
must have "the ability to empathize and to feel guilt. '27 He continues:
"Unless an agent is able to put himself affectively in another's shoes,... and
is able at least to feel the anticipation of unpleasant guilt for breach, that
agent will lack the capacity to grasp and be guided by the primary rational
20. Id. at 117 (stating that on her view, a person's status as a responsible agent requires
not only the ability to act in accordance with her deepest values, but also the ability to assess
and revise those values in light of what reasons truly exist).
21. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 154-55.
22. In his renowned article, "Freedom and Resentment," P.F. Strawson argues that our
practices of holding each other responsible must be understood in light of the web of reactive
attitudes we experience within our interpersonal relationships, such as resentment,
indignation, gratitude, hurt feelings, and forgiveness. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment, xlviii PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 1 (1962), reprinted in FREE WILL
59 (Gary Watson ed., 1982). To hold a person to expectations or demands is to be prone to
these attitudes in our dealings with her, on Strawson's account. FREE WILL, supra, at 77.
Strawson argues that we need not look to justify our practices of holding each other
responsible by appealing to a set of metaphysical requirements for responsible agency that
exist independently and externally to these social practices. Instead, that most persons are
responsible for their conduct is implicit in the demands we place on each other. These
demands are inherent in the attitudes and feelings we naturally experience within our
interpersonal lives. Id. at 77.
23. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 52-62.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 154-55.
26. Morse, Deprivation, supra note 2, at 119-23.
27. Id. at 122.
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reasons for complying with moral expectations. 28 It is unfair, on Morse's
account, to blame and sanction someone who lacks the capacity to be moved
by such moral considerations, although we may incapacitate that agent
insofar as he represents a danger to us.
29
T.M. Scanlon also endorses a reasons-responsive view, arguing that
agents capable of rational self-governance may be held responsible for their
intentions and other attitudes that are sensitive to reasoning. 30 It is
reasonable, at least in principle, to ask a rational creature to justify her
intentions or other attitudes (including other attitudes conveyed through her
conduct) in terms of reasons; in contrast, it is unreasonable to demand a
justification for one's height or eye color. 31 However, Scanlon rejects
including among the requirements for responsibility any special capacity for
grasping and being guided by distinctly moral reasons.32 Underlying his
disagreement with Wallace and others on this matter is Scanlon's opposing
account of what it means, within our interpersonal lives, to be held morally
responsible for wrongdoing.
The essence of holding an agent responsible for wrongdoing on
Scanlon's view is tied to his contractualist account of the content of moral
reasoning about what we owe to one another.33 Scanlon depicts moral
reasoning as an inquiry into principles for the regulation of behavior that no
one could reasonably reject insofar as each person is motivated to find such
principles.34 Guiding our behavior by principles no one could reasonably
reject expresses our mutual respect for one another as persons-as ends in
ourselves.35 An act is wrong then, on Scanlon's account, "if any principle
that permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected, 36 and thus
fails to respect the value of another person as a person. Moral criticism, when
addressed to an agent, calls on her to reconsider her intentions or other
28. Id.
29. Id. at 123.
30. SCANLON, supra note 3, at 21-22.
31. Id. at289.
32. Id. at 287-90.
33. Scanlon does not talk in terms of "holding agents responsible," but rather in terms of
"moral criticism." See id. at 288. But the essential idea is similar: to judge that moral criticism
of an agent is appropriate is to hold that agent to a moral demand and to judge that the agent
has violated that demand.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Rahul Kumar, Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common Sense,
28 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 275, 278 (1999).
36. SCANLON, supra note 3, at 4.
[Vol. 39:349
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reason-sensitive attitudes and "either to explain why the criticism is
unjustified or to modify or withdraw them. 37
In light of that claim regarding moral criticism, one might argue that to
hold fairly an agent responsible for wrongdoing, that agent must be capable
of modifying or reconsidering her morally relevant attitudes, i.e., that agent
must not only be able to reason practically, but also to grasp and be guided
by distinctly moral considerations.38 Indeed, Wallace argues that Scanlon
should agree with that conclusion given Scanlon's account of moral
criticism. 39 Wallace asks how an appeal to an agent to reconsider, explain, or
modify his relevant attitudes could "be warranted if the agent is not capable
of understanding the moral principles upon which the appeal rests?
40
Nonetheless, Scanlon rejects adding moral competence to the conditions
of responsibility in light of his account of the interpersonal significance of
holding an agent morally responsible. Holding someone at fault for violating
a moral obligation should not be understood in terms of the reactive attitudes
associated with moral blame or their expression through sanctioning
behavior, according to Scanlon.41 To wrong another person, on his account,
is to flout requirements founded on the value of the other person as a fellow
rational creature.42 Failing to see the value of chess or music might place
limitations on one's relationships with others who care deeply about those
things, but failing to see another's value as a rational self-governor-as an
end in herself-precludes any kind of meaningful or decent relationship.
Even if I do not share your love of music, I "can still be a good neighbor, co-
worker, or even a friend. ' 3 However, the implications of failing to see your
value as a person are wide-ranging and severe. Scanlon agrees that our
feelings of resentment and expression of moral sanction evidence the
importance we attach to being treated respectfully, but the primary
significance of holding someone responsible for a wrong lies not in what one
might do in response, "but rather in what is, if the criticism is correct, already
the case." 44 If one fails to respect another's value as an end in herself, their
37. Id. at 275.
38. Id. at 287.
39. R. Jay Wallace, Scanlon's Contractualism, 112 ETHICS 429, 444 (2002), reprinted
in R. JAY WALLACE, NORMATIVITY AND THE WILL: SELECTED PAPERS ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND PRACTICAL REASON 263, 276 (2006).
40. Id.
41. See SCANLON, supra note 3, at 271.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 159.
44. Id. at 272.
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relationship is fundamentally altered regardless of whether the wronged party
expresses any response.
Scanlon then suggests a way to decide whether to include a condition
among the requirements of moral responsibility: "A plausible test for
deciding whether a given condition should be taken to rule out moral
criticism is to ask whether the behavior of a creature which has that condition
would, for that reason, lack the distinctive significance that moral failings
generally have for relations with others."45 The question, when applied to the
present question would be the following: would the wrongful actions of an
agent capable of practical reasoning have different implications for his
relations with others depending on whether he also has the distinct capacity
to grasp and apply moral reasons?
Scanlon answers this question in the negative, rejecting moral
competence as a criterion of responsibility. As long as an agent, capable of
reasoning, fails to respect the value of others, her actions "would have
implications for [her] relations with others that are at least very similar to (if
not identical with) those of an agent who understood the relevant moral
reasons but simply rejected them."46 Being unable to see the force of moral
reasons still qualifies as failing to respect the value of others.47 Scanlon
concludes with an appeal to common sense: "If [someone] commits ...
crimes because he does not place any value on other people's lives or
interests, what clearer grounds could one have for saying that he is a bad
person and behaves wrongly?"
48
B. Addressing the Disagreement
We might start to address the debate concerning the criteria of moral
responsibility by turning to the issue that underlies the different views held
by Scanlon and Wallace: their accounts of the "special depth" of moral
judgments or, rather, the interpersonal significance of being held responsible.
If one theorist's account of the significance of responsibility judgments is
more persuasive, then that fact would support that theorist's account of the
criteria of responsibility.
Wallace argues that the reactive attitudes and their expression through
sanctioning behavior help explain the distinctive significance of moral
blame. If we were to define what it means to hold someone morally
45. Id. at 287-88.
46. Id. at 288.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 284.
[Vol. 39:349
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responsible for wrongdoing simply in terms of a belief that the agent has
violated a moral obligation, then "[b]lame would be rendered superficial on
this account, reduced to a way of describing what an agent has done, and
perhaps registering a causal connection between the agent and the action so
described." 49
However, the reactive attitudes and their expression do not seem capable
of explaining any distinct significance to holding an agent responsible for
wrongdoing.50 As Wallace highlights, reactive attitudes such as resentment
and indignation can be characterized as moral or non-moral, depending upon
the content of their underlying propositional content.51 Indignation may be
characterized as moral insofar as it is felt in response to a belief that an agent
has violated a moral obligation. However, we may also experience
indignation upon belief that an agent fails to appreciate, or perhaps
denigrates, something we take to be of important value, although she did not
violate any moral obligation owed to anyone. For example, one might feel
indignation towards' someone who believes there is nothing of value about
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge except its oil.
Moreover, even if resentment and indignation were exclusively moral
reactive attitudes, it is unclear why they provide their accompanying
judgments a depth that other emotions do not supply. What is especially
"deep" about resentment and indignation, as opposed to other attitudes we
feel towards others, such as disgust or jealousy? I am not sure; perhaps there
is a persuasive answer.
Nonetheless, the "special depth" of holding an agent morally responsible
on Scanlon's account is not mysterious. The judgment that an agent fails to
respect others' value as persons more deeply "affect[s] the range of relations
we can have with that person. 2 That someone does not share your interest
in music might prevent a close friendship; but if someone cannot be trusted,
that damages more thoroughly--or more deeply-the kinds of interpersonal
relationships that are possible with him. To use Wallace's helpful description
of Scanlon's account, "[m]oral faults introduce basic rifts into the social
fabric" that other evaluative judgments do not create.53
49. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 78.
50. I discuss in more detail Wallace's Strawsonian account of the special force of moral
judgments in Paul Litton, The Insignificance of Choice and Wallace's Normative Approach to
Responsibility, 26 LAW & PHIL. 67, 83-92 (2007).
51. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 33-40.
52. SCANLON, supra note 3, at 159.
53. Wallace, supra note 39, at 442.
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If Wallace's Strawsonian account of the special depth or interpersonal
significance of holding an agent responsible for wrongdoing is not
persuasive, then we lose the basis for his claim that fairness must guide our
inquiry into the criteria for moral responsibility. Accordingly, there is no
basis for claiming that fairness requires that we hold morally responsible
only those practical reasoners who have the capacity to grasp and apply the
distinctly moral reasons that support our moral obligations.
However, though Scanlon's account of the interpersonal significance of
blaming judgments is more persuasive, that fact does not imply that his
conclusion regarding the criteria of moral responsibility is correct. Scanlon
acknowledges the tension between his claim that moral criticism calls on an
agent to modify, justify, or explain his behavior, and his conclusion that we
need not include moral competence as a criterion for responsibility. In the
end, he excludes moral competence on the ground that it makes no practical
difference for an agent's interpersonal relations whether he lacks the capacity
to understand moral reasons or whether he simply ignores moral
considerations that he does grasp. Perhaps Scanlon's empirical observation is
correct. Nevertheless, maybe it should make a difference within our
interpersonal lives as to whether an agent has no capacity to grasp moral
considerations or whether he simply ignores them. As Wallace suggests, if it
would be pointless to ask an agent incapable of moral reasoning to modify or
justify his behavior in light of moral considerations, maybe it is inappropriate
to hold that agent morally responsible for any apparent wrongdoing.
5 4
Here, I do not reach any firm conclusion on this debate about the
interpersonal significance of holding responsible and its relation to the
criteria for responsibility. For present purposes, I am satisfied to view it as a
stalemate. Instead, I will address the debate indirectly by questioning
whether there is any meaningful disagreement here regarding the conditions
of responsibility.
III. Is THERE ANY MEANINGFUL DISAGREEMENT?
A. Candidates for the Area of Disagreement
Meaningful disagreement exists between the opposing views on the
criteria for responsibility only if there are or conceivably could be agents
who do have the capacity for rational self-governance but lack the capacity
to grasp and apply moral considerations. Put differently, if an agent's
54. See id. at 444.
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diminished or lack of capacity for grasping and applying moral
considerations tracks more general deficits in her capacity for rational self-
governance, then meaningful disagreement would not seem to exist.
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, who defend a sophisticated
reasons-responsive approach to responsibility, argue that moral competence
is a criterion of responsibility based on the assumption that there are, in fact,
agents who are reasons-responsive but lack the capacity for moral
competence. 55 They argue that inclusion of the capacity for moral
competence among the responsibility criteria helps explain why we
"ordinarily judge]" young children, intelligent animals, and psychopaths to
be non-responsible.56 Because these agents have some capacity to respond to
instrumental reasons, Fischer and Ravizza argue that the rationale for
deeming them non-responsible is that they lack the capacity to "understand[]
and appreciat[e] ... moral reasons. 57
Fischer and Ravizza's argument is unpersuasive, though. First, it is a
mistake to include psychopaths among this group because there is no shared
firm commitment that psychopaths are non-responsible. We normally hold
psychopaths criminally responsible, and that fact provides at least some
evidence that there is no widespread firm commitment that psychopaths are
not morally responsible for their wrongdoing. Robert Hare, perhaps the
leading researcher of psychopathy, opines that "psychopaths certainly know
enough about what they are doing to be held accountable for their actions. ' 58
Second, we do not need to add any distinct capacity to grasp moral reasons to
explain our ordinary judgment that animals and young children are not
responsible agents, given that they do not have developed rational capacities.
Young children, for example, are not able to fully appreciate prudential
reasons either. We need not to point to something special about moral
reasoning because they lack general reasoning capacities.
Older children and adolescents also do not occupy the area of
disagreement between the two camps of theorists. We recognize that these
young persons, as a class, are hastier, immature, and not as well equipped to
appreciate the long-term consequences of their actions. Because they have
not invested comparably much time and energy in life projects, they also do
not have the experience required to appreciate what is of great importance to
others. Certainly, these characteristics are relevant to their abilities to reason
55. See FISCHER& RAVIZZA, supra note 2, 76-81.
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id.
58. ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE
PSYCHOPATHS AMONG US 143 (1993).
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morally; but they also support our belief that young people frequently do not
know what is even in their own best self-interest. Whether or not the criteria
of responsible agency include a special capacity to grasp and apply moral
considerations, there is good reason that we do not hold older children and
adolescents as responsible as we hold normal functioning adults.
Another important reason why we do not hold and consider young
persons fully responsible is because they are still developing their
personalities. 59 They are in the process of trying to discover what they stand
for and how to view the world. When their actions express negative
characteristics, we are reluctant to fully attribute a stable negative trait to
them, because they are still learning and because we are still responsible for
their development. In fact, it is quite clear from our practices that any special
requirement for moral competence is not that relevant to our judgments about
older youth. Many adolescents are probably more morally sensitive and have
better moral reasoning skills than many adults whom we hold fully
responsible. Nonetheless, we still consider all members of the class of older
children and adolescents less than fully responsible because they are still
developing their personalities.
Perhaps in thinking that the capacity to grasp and apply distinctly moral
reasons is a criterion of responsibility, one has in mind an agent who has
been severely and thoroughly abused throughout childhood, such that this
person has never been shown the value of participating in relationships based
on mutual respect. Or perhaps, as a result of years of abuse, this person feels
unworthy of respectful relationships and engages in antisocial, self-
destructive behavior that "confirms [his] sense of failure and
worthlessness." 6 Such abuse can cause deficits in rational capacities,
perhaps by weakening an agent's capacity for controlling impulses,
particularly in stressful and threatening situations. 61 But a theorist might have
in mind the possibility that a person could have the capacity for practical
reasoning but, because of an unspeakably tragic childhood, is understandably
unmoved by moral considerations. Many people might find such an agent
less than fully responsible for adult antisocial acts, and the proposed
59. See SCANLON, supra note 3, at 281 ("The circumstances of childhood... block the
attribution of [negative] characteristics to the agent we are judgment. Overcoming these
effects is a process of growth, not of reform.").
60. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 233.
61. Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death
Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1143, 1165 (1999); see also JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATH:
EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 35-37 (2005) (discussing the relationship between environmental
stressors, such as abuse, and an increased risk for reactive aggression).
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underlying rationale would be that the agent has a diminished capacity for
moral competence given the abuse he suffered.
However, assuming that the agent's capacity for rational self-governance
is not compromised, his lack of motivation to conform to moral norms is not
best characterized as an incapacity to grasp and apply moral considerations.
Rather, it is just that: a lack of motivation, a failure (an understandable one)
to see the force of moral reasons and of the value of interpersonal interaction
based on mutual respect. The fact that someone does not see the force of
reasons associated with a particular value does not imply that the person
lacks the general capacity to understand claims based on those reasons.
I am not arguing that a person's history of suffering relentless abuse is
irrelevant to thinking about how it is appropriate to treat that person
generally or in response to her wrongdoing.62 Rather, I submit that the
practical reasoner who fails to appreciate the force of moral considerations-
perhaps due to his tragic exposure to relentless childhood abuse-does not




Before turning to the prime candidate for disagreement-the
psychopath-I want to raise some thoughts on why it is difficult to conceive
an agent who truly has an undiminished capacity for rational self-governance
yet lacks the capacity to understand moral considerations. As noted above,
normal functioning adults have the capacity to reflect on and evaluate their
motivation. We do not merely experience first-order desires and act on those
that, at any given time, are motivationally strongest. We act for reasons, and
62. I argue that capital juries are indeed justified in viewing evidence of severe
childhood abuse as mitigating in Paul Litton, The 'Abuse Excuse' in Capital Sentencing
Trials: Is It Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or Neither? 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027
(2005).
63. I realize that I am making a stark distinction between the psychopath-who could
not have been socialized-and the sociopath who is unmotivated to respect others because of
a terrible childhood, though, in actuality, there are agents whose failure to respect others is
due to both biological and environmental causes, and who do not clearly represent one
category to the exclusion of the other. However, I am relying on the work of psychopathy
researchers, such as David Lykken, showing that there are significant differences in traits
between agents who "failed to acquire the attributes of socialization.., because of a failure of
the usual socializing agents" (sociopaths), and the psychopath, "whose innate temperament
made him unusually difficult to socialize." DAviD T. LYKKEN, THE ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITIES vii-viii (1995).
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treating a consideration as a reason for action involves, at least implicitly,
some evaluation about the desirability of the end of that action. We have the
capacity to evaluate the desirability of our first-order desires, to decide
whether we should treat any particular desire as providing a reason-a
justifying end-for action.64 Some philosophers discuss these points in terms
of our capacity to form higher-order desires, to have values, to have
standards, etc. Though use of different terms may represent different views
about the nature of practical reason, I do not think that such disagreements
are pertinent here. Thus, though we may talk about higher-order desires, etc.,
I will refer to our capacity to step back and evaluate first-order desires in
terms of our capacity to possess evaluative standards, standards according to
which we evaluate and assess what we have good reason to do.
Consider some facts about reasoning agents who have stable, coherent
evaluative standards that they endorse over time. Certain plans, projects,
relationships and people matter in some way to agents with evaluative
standards. Having standards involves "having some conception of the kinds
of actions we wish to perform or to avoid, the kinds of persons we wish to
be, the kinds of characteristics we wish to have or to avoid having, and so
forth. ''65 We take certain things, kinds of lives, characteristics, etc., to be
valuable or important.
When faced with particular desires, we must decide whether such desires
provide us with reason for action in light of what it is that we care about it
and find important. But it is not only our desires that we must evaluate. As
social creatures, we have no choice but to consider other people and their
interests in our deliberations, having to decide whether their interests provide
us with any reasons.
One might wonder, then, why an agent would be able to reflect on and
assess whether her desires provide reasons for action but not whether
someone else's interests provide reasons for or against certain actions. Why
should we believe that the capacity for assessing whether other people's
interests provide reasons for action is distinct from the capacity to assess
whether any other facts about the world provide reasons for action?
Moreover, given that rational agents have standards regarding what
matters to them-what they take to be important-it would seem that they
would have at least the capacity (even if not the motivation) to understand
the claim that other people's interests are also important and, as such,
64. Michael E. Bratman, Valuing and the Will, 14 PHIL. PERSP. 249, 258 (2000),
reprinted in MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, STRUCTURES OF AGENCY: ESSAYS 47, 61-62 (2007).
65. HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 126-27 (1998).
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provide reasons for and against certain actions. 66 An agent might reject the
idea that other people's interests provide him any reasons for or against
action, but rejecting that idea does not imply an incapacity to grasp what it
asserts. In fact, rejecting the claim assumes at least some level of
understanding.
It is particularly difficult to conceive an agent who values at least some
other person, whether a friend or family member, and yet simultaneously
lacks the capacity to grasp moral considerations that speak in favor of
respecting the interests of all people. Valuing an interpersonal relationship
involves holding oneself to certain standards that regard the well-being of the
other person. To care about another person involves caring about that other
person's interests for their own sake, not because of any instrumental value
to oneself. As Bernard Williams clearly states, someone who has attachments
to other persons has the capacity to grasp moral considerations, even if this
person exhibits no regard for persons to whom he is not attached. This
person must have
the notion of doing something for somebody, because that person needs
something. He operates with this notion in fact only when he is so inclined;
but it is not itself the notion of his being so inclined. Even if he helps...
people [to whom he is attached] because he wants to, or because he likes
them, and for no other reason .... what he wants to do is to help them in
their need, and the thought he has when he likes someone and acts in this
way is "they need help," not the thought "I like them and they need help."
This is a vital point: this man is capable of thinking in terms of others'
interests, and his failure to be a moral agent lies (partly) in the fact that he is
only intermittently and capriciously disposed to do so. But there is no
bottomless gulf between this state and the basic dispositions of morality.
There are people who need help who are not people who at the moment he
happens to want to help, or likes; and there are other people who like and
want to help other particular people in need. To get him to consider their
situation seems rather an extension of his imagination and his understanding,
than a discontinuous step onto something quite different, the "moral plane."
67
66. See Duff, supra note 2, at 198 ("If (someone] exhibits some conception of, and
concern for, interests of his own, he is in a position to understand the interests of others, as
providing them with reasons for action .... ).
67. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHics 9-10 (1972) (third
emphasis added); see also Duff, supra note 2, at 198 ("[I]f he displays love or friendship for
another, he is in a position to understand the significance of such relationships for others, and
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If an agent truly is incapable of grasping and being guided by moral
considerations, then we should also expect this agent not to value-and to be
incapable of valuing-any persons or interpersonal relationships. (And, as
described below, this expectation is met with regard to the psychopath).
As stated, I offer these remarks to suggest that there might not be
significant disagreement between the responsibility theorists. But perhaps
empirical evidence proves otherwise. Maybe there are agents-
psychopaths-who do lack the capacity to grasp and apply moral reasons but
otherwise possess a normal capacity for rational self-governance. On the
other hand, if psychopaths have a diminished capacity for moral reasoning
which is a symptom of deeper, more general deficits in rational capacities,
then an investigation into the relationship between their rational and moral
capacities can inform our thinking on whether any agents could conceivably
occupy the area of disagreement between the responsibility theorists.
IV. INDIVIDUALS WITH PSYCHOPATHY
A. The Disorder
Psychopathy is not listed as a condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual ("DSM-IV"), published by the American Psychiatric Association.
Rather, researchers identify psychopathic individuals as a subclass of persons
having antisocial personality disorder ("ASPD"), which is a DSM-IV
diagnosis. 68 To understand psychopathy, then, let us start with ASPD.
ASPD is classified as a personality disorder,69 conveying a "pervasive
pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in
childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood."7° A
already has the kind of concern for another which is closely related to a moral concern ... 
(citing WILLIAMS, supra)).
68. The DSM-IV does state that antisocial personality disorder "has also been referred
to as psychopathy, sociopathy, or dyssocial personality disorder." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 645 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter
DSM-IV]. However, researchers who study psychopathic individuals describe them as a
particular subclass of the population with antisocial personality disorder. See infra notes 72-87
and accompanying text.
69. According to the DSM-IV, a "personality disorder is an enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable
over time, and leads to distress or impairment." DSM-IV, supra note 68, at 629.
70. Id. at 645.
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"pervasive pattern" of disregarding others' rights is diagnosable when a
subject presents with three of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity of failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. 7
1
These criteria focus solely on whether a person engages in certain kinds of
behavior.
Because of ASPD's sole focus on "actions rather than ... psychological
dispositions or traits," many researchers find it to be medically and
scientifically unhelpful, classifying together a heterogeneous group of
persons.72 One individual satisfying criteria one, two and four (repeatedly
71. Id. at 649-50. In addition, an individual diagnosed with ASPD must be eighteen
years of age or older; the "occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the
course of Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode;" and there must be "evidence of Conduct
Disorder... with onset before age 15 years." Id. at 650. Conduct disorder is the analogue to
ASPD for minors. Id. at 646. It involves a "repetitive and persistent pattern of behavior in
which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate societal norms or rules are violated."
Id.
72. LYKKEN, supra note 63, at 4; see also BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 8, 12; HARE,
supra note 58, at 24-25 ("The diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder consist
primarily of a long list of antisocial and criminal behaviors. . .. 'Psychopathy,' on the other
hand, is defined by a cluster of both personality traits and socially deviant behaviors."
(emphasis added)). Hare claims that when the criteria for antisocial personality disorder were
being developed, "it was felt that the average clinician could not reliably assess personality
2008]
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breaks the law, lies, and assaults) might represent a typical repeat violent
offender. Other individuals might qualify as having the disorder even though
they are not criminals at all. Someone might satisfy criteria three, five, and
six (fails to plan ahead, recklessly disregards own safety, and fails to sustain
consistent work) due to having a drug or alcohol addiction, without
73
assaulting other persons.
Based on recent research, Blair and colleagues distinguish between at
least two groups of aggressive individuals.74 First, they refer to individuals
who engage primarily in reactive aggression: aggression in response to a
frustrating or threatening event without aiming toward any further goal.75
Individuals diagnosed as psychopaths, however, belong to a second group. In
addition to presenting with high levels of reactive aggression, this second
group also engages in elevated levels of instrumental aggression:
76
aggression "used instrumentally to achieve a specific desired goal ... [such




Blair and colleagues argue that normal socialization methods are
ineffective with individuals who become diagnosable with psychopathy
because of "an impairment in performing specific forms of emotional
learning [which is] symptomatic of an underlying dysfunction involving
specific neural and neurotransmitter systems. 78 These researchers argue that,
in light of twin studies, "a strong case can be made" that the underlying
cause of the dysfunction of the neural and neurotransmitter systems is
genetic, not environmental. 79 Environmental causes (including birth
complications and exposure to abuse) increase one's risk for reactive
aggression. 80 For example, environmental stress is correlated with increases
in hormonal responses to perceived threats and other physiological responses
traits such as empathy, egocentricity, guilt, and so forth." HARE, supra note 58, at 24-25.
Therefore, the developed criteria included only objective behaviors. Id. Cf Duff, supra note 2,
at 190 ("[I]f crime is the criterion of psychopathy, the label becomes utterly uninformative: it
neither explains nor illuminatingly redescribes criminal conduct, but simply marks its
occurrence; it precludes any distinction between psychopathic and other criminals.").
73. LYKKEN, supra note 63, at 4-5.
74. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 12. The authors do not indicate that these two
distinct populations of aggressive individuals include all people who would present with
antisocial personality disorder. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing LEONARD BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION: ITS CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
CONTROL 7 (1993)).
78. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 28.
79. Id. at 30.
80. See id. at 12, 37.
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that cause someone to more readily react with aggression.8' On the other
hand, Blair and colleagues report that no data support the claim that
environmental stressors can give rise to the emotional dysfunction and
combination of reactive/instrumental aggression that is definitive of
psychopathy.82 Social causes do influence the "behavioral manifestation of
the underlying cause[;]" there could be individuals with the emotional
dysfunction of psychopaths who, because of more fortunate social
circumstances, do not need to engage in antisocial behavior to get what they
want, and thus would not present with the full syndrome. 83 Nonetheless,
Blair and colleagues argue that the underlying cause of psychopathy is an
emotional dysfunction that impedes socialization.84 Their argument echoes
the distinction that David Lykken, who was a leading researcher of antisocial
personalities, drew between the "sociopath" and the "psychopath." Lykken
referred to the "psychopath" as the agent who, from birth, "possesses
inherent peculiarities of temperament that make him unusually intractable to
socialization. ' 85 He used "sociopath" to refer to persons who could have
been socialized through normal methods but rather became the "feral
products of indifferent, incompetent, or overburdened parents.
86
The different etiologies are important not as causes per se, but because
the characteristics of antisocial persons seem to vary depending upon the
87
underlying cause(s) of their antisocial natures. We now turn to the peculiar
characteristics of agents who, from birth, appear immune to socialization
methods.
In addition to engaging in antisocial conduct, persons with psychopathy
have particular interpersonal and affective traits. In 1941, Hervey Cleckley
described the characteristics of the psychopathic individual:8 8 superficial
81. Id. at 37. Environmental stress also augments the amygdale, which in turn increases
one's risk for reactive aggression. Id. at 36.
82. Id. at 37.
83. Id. at 39.
84. Id. at 37.
85. LYKKEN, supra note 63, at 6.
86. Id. at viii.
87. It is not as if there is only one cause of a person's antisocial nature. Id. at 7 ("The
psychopath and the sociopath can be regarded as opposite endpoints on a common dimension
with difficult temperament maximized at the psychopathic end and inadequate parenting
maximized at the sociopathic end.").
88. See generally HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY: AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY
SOME ISSUES ABOUT THE SO-CALLED PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY (5th ed. 1988). Cleckley's
book "continues to provide a vital point of reference for contemporary researchers in the field
of psychopathy as well as clinicians in a range of settings." Christopher J. Patrick, Back to the
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chann; 89 an utter lack of remorse or shame, and the absence of all other
indications of accepting responsibility for his own misfortunes or those he
inflicts upon others; 9° antisocial behavior that appears inadequately
motivated, and is committed for "astonishingly small stakes ... in the
absence of any apparent goal at all[;]" 91 and pathological egocentrism with
an incapacity for love and a "general poverty of affect." 92 Cleckley also
described the psychopathic individual as void of "strong or tragic feeling"
93
and without insight into how others feel about him.94 He only has superficial
relationships with others, 95 and "shows a striking inability to follow any sort
of life plan consistently."
96
Based on Cleckley's findings as well as his own work, Robert Hare
developed the Psychopathy Checklist (which he has since revised) ("PCL-
R"), an instrument used to assess psychopathy in adults. 97 The tool tracks
many of the same characteristics reflective of psychopathy noted by
Cleckley. With regard to interpersonal and affective traits, reflecting the
callousness and narcissism of psychopaths, tested individuals are evaluated
on whether they exhibit the following characteristics or conduct: (1) glib and
exhibit shallow charm; (2) a grandiose sense of self-importance; (3) lie
pathologically; (4) con and manipulate others; (5) a remarkable incapacity
for remorse or guilt; (6) otherwise experience shallow affect; and (7) not
accept responsibility for their actions. 98 Other traits assessed regard the
psychopath's antisocial behavior, including the following: (1) poor behavior
controls, (2) no realistic and long-term goals, (3) impulsivity, and (4)
juvenile delinquency. 99 In total, the instrument lists twenty behavioral and
personality traits, and directs the mental health professional to attribute zero
to two points for each trait to the examined subject. °0 Researchers attribute
Future: Cleckley as a Guide to the Next Generation of Psychopathy Research, in HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOPATHY 605, 606 (Christopher J. Patrick ed., 2006).
89. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 338; see also Larry J. Siever, Neurobiology in
Psychopathy, in PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 231
(Theodore Millon et al. eds., 1998).
90. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 340, 343; see also Siever, supra note 89, at 231.
91. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 343.
92. Id. at 348.
93. Id. at 349.
94. Id. at 350.
95. Id. at 354.
96. Id. at 364.
97. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 7; see generally HARE, supra note 58.
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psychopathy to adults scoring thirty or above, and adults who score less than
twenty are not considered to have the disorder. 10' Accordingly, psychopathy
is a continuum concept afflicting individuals to different degrees. 10 2 Despite
that fact, use of the PCL-R instrument produces strong inter-rater
reliability.' 03
B. Psychopathy and the Capacity for Moral Competence
Individuals with psychopathy easily and frequently commit immoral
acts, whether or not those acts are illegal and lead to imprisonment. The fact
of psychopaths' repeated immoralities, however, cannot show that they are
incapable of moral reasoning or that they should not be held morally
responsible for their conduct."°4 Evil should not represent its own excuse. So
in light of their reasoning abilities, freedom from psychosis, and effective
wills, it might not be evident why one would conclude that psychopaths lack
the capacity to conform their conduct to morality's demands and, on that
basis, should not be considered morally accountable. 105
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id. at 8-10; see also LYKKEN, supra note 63, at 7.
103. Siever, supra note 89, at 231. It also "has been validated in terms of its predictive
power for recidivism in criminal populations." Id.
104. After defining "mental disorder" as an "abnormal and harmful impairment of
[one's] rational capacities," Antony Duff argues that accounts of agents' criminal and
antisocial behavior "provide by themselves no proof of disorder." Duff, supra note 2, at 190.
Assuming that possession of a disorder, according to Duff's definition of that term, implies
that an agent is less than fully responsible, Duff writes: "Persistent criminality, for instance,
could be a criterion of disorder only within a determinist perspective which, denying
responsibility to anyone, takes the fact of crime as proof that 'something has gone wrong.'
Id.
105. Indeed, some research purportedly shows that psychopaths are capable of moral
reasoning, at least on par with non-psychopathic criminal offenders. BLAIR ET AL., supra note
61, at 57. After presenting psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders hypothetical stories
involving moral dilemmas, researchers judged the complexity of the moral reasoning offered
by the subjects. Id. at 57-58. Some studies concluded that psychopathic offenders exhibited
lower levels of moral reasoning than non-psychopathic counterparts, id. (citing three studies
conducted in the 1970s); but other studies found no difference, id. (citing two studies from the
late 1980s). However, Blair and colleagues argue that these kinds of studies only measure
moral semantic memory without assessing the subjects' understanding of the reasons they
offer. IQ and socioeconomic status are correlated with both semantic memory and moral
reasoning. Therefore, Blair and colleagues argue, these kinds of "moral reasoning" tests might
only "index[] IQ and the individual's cultural experiences rather than their moral reasoning
per se." Id. at 57.
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To understand the claim that psychopaths lack moral capacities, let's
turn to Wallace's criteria of responsibility. He argues that responsibility
requires two powers of reflective self-control: (1) the power to grasp and
apply moral reasons; and (2) the power to control or regulate one's behavior
in light of such reasons.1 6 The key issue is whether they lack the former.
Wallace persuasively emphasizes that that power to grasp and apply moral
reasons goes beyond the ability to know what actions are deemed "right" and
"wrong.' 0 7 A young child might know very well that lying or kicking a
sibling is called "wrong," but we would not attribute to her the power to
grasp and apply moral reasons on that basis. Accountable agents have a
"participant understanding of the moral reasons that support [our]
obligations, enabling one not merely to parrot moral discourse but also to
apply moral principles intelligently from case to case.' ' 8 An accountable
agent understands moral principles in a way that allows her to apply them in
different factual contexts and to negotiate competing reasons for action in
circumstances where multiple moral principles are relevant. 109
One reason why psychopaths seem incapable of moral competence on
Wallace's account is that research indicates that they have substantial
difficulty gauging the varying importance of different human concerns. To
start, since the mid-1970s, a significant body of research concludes that
normal functioning persons recognize a distinction between transgression of
moral rules and conventional rules."I0 Moral rules generally refer to those
that regard protections against harm and rights-violations (e.g., prohibitions
against killing and stealing)."' Generally, the idea advanced by this research
106. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 157.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 178.
109. Id. at 157, 178. Duff writes similarly:
For what does the competent and astute discussion of moral issues involve? It involves
more than the ability to apply learned formulae which provide descriptive criteria for the
identification of actions to which moral labels can then be attached-of this an intelligent
psychopath may well be capable. A person who is to exhibit moral understanding must also be
able to explain and criticise these moral rules-which involves more than showing how they
do or do not derive from other formulae; he must be able to show how these rules may or may
not be extended to cover new cases, which do not fall exactly under any specified set of
descriptive criteria; to discuss rationally the resolution, or the impossibility of resolving, cases
of conflict. Following moral rules . . . requires a creative capacity to understand the
significance of the value in question, and to discuss, extend, and criticise its application.
Duff, supra note 2, at 195.
110. Daniel Kelly et al., Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction, 22
MIND & LANGUAGE 117, 117-18 (2007).
111. Id.
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is that most people recognize moral rules as universally applicable, authority-
independent (they exist even if no authority commands them or whether
society sanctions such rules); and their violation is judged to be more serious
than conventional transgressions. Conventional rules would include mores
against cross-dressing and licking clean one's dinner plate." 2 According to
this research, conventional rules are generally recognized as authority-
dependent, relative to time and place, and their justification does not appeal
to the importance of rights or protecting persons from harm." 3 Here is the
relevance: though children as young as thirty-nine months and people across
multiple cultures recognize a distinction between these (purportedly)
different kinds of rules, 1 4 "[c]hildren with psychopathic tendencies and
adults with psychopathy have considerable difficulty with the
moral/conventional distinction task.
'' 15
Recent empirical research may provide good reason to doubt that the
studies based on the moral/conventional distinction shed light on the nature
of moral judgment (perhaps because further studies show that many people
characterize some rules as authority-independent even though violations of
these rules do not harm anyone or infringe anyone's rights); 1 6 it is possible
that the original studies based on the moral/conventional distinction do not
tell us much about the incapacities of the psychopath. 1 7 Nevertheless,
accounts of individual psychopathic offenders in the psychological literature
paint pictures of people who are shockingly unable to gauge the relative
importance of different human concerns-or, at least, incredibly unaware
that their voiced opinions about the relative weight of different concerns
would be viewed as crazy." 8 For example, consider the justification for rape
offered by a convicted psychopathic offender, interviewed by Hare. He
claimed his actions actually had a positive effect on his victims:
"The next day I'd get a newspaper and read about a caper I'd pulled-a
robbery or rape. There'd be interviews with the victims. They'd get their
names in the paper. Women, for example, would say nice things about me-
112. Id. at 117.
113. Id. at 119.
114. Id.
115. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 58.
116. Kelly et al., supra note 110, at 120-21.
117. Id. at 129-30.
118. Cleckley hypothesizes that the essence of the defect in personality of the
psychopath "consists of an unawareness and a persistent lack of ability to become aware of
what the most important experiences of life mean to others." CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 371.
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that I was really polite and considerate, very meticulous. I wasn't abusive to
them, you understand. Some of them thanked me."
119
Apparently, this offender knows some things that people like: notoriety from
being mentioned in a newspaper, being treated considerately and politely,
etc. But if he offers this justification genuinely, its absurdity leaves us
without words.
Just to be clear, it is not the case that psychopathic individuals like
Hare's convicted rapist provide unpersuasive justifications for their
wrongdoing, in the way that mafia or gang members or neo-Nazis might
offer reasons for their wrongful violence that reasonable people find
unpersuasive. A non-psychopathic mob boss is not incapable of grasping and
being guided by moral considerations in virtue of the fact that he rejects
some fundamental aspects of common morality. He is capable of grasping
moral principles, for he endorses those of his group and tries to live up to
them. He can empathize, as he does with his fellow members. Our convicted
rapist, on the other hand, endorses no moral principles. He is not, say, some
confused utilitarian who mistakenly thinks his crimes maximize happiness.
As someone diagnosed with psychopathy, he feels no empathy for anyone.
To the extent that he is truly unfamiliar with guilt or remorse, he holds
himself to no moral standards at all. 120 As researchers describe them,
psychopathic individuals appear to be mimicking us when they engage in
moral reasoning.
As further evidence of their striking lack of moral understanding, the
psychopathic individuals described in the literature do not seem to grasp the
kinds of behavior that we take to implicate the moral quality of one's
character. If an agent does not understand that repetitively harming others
intentionally or recklessly, and repeatedly deceiving others, for example, are
relevant to the moral assessment others will make of his character, then we
cannot fathom a moral dialogue with him.' 2' The literature describes people
who seem genuinely baffled when confronted with moral criticism or upon
119. HARE, supra note 58, at 43.
120. Because of their "notably reduced affective input to linguistic processing," BLAIR
ET AL., supra note 61, at 62, "individuals with psychopathy have been found to show
anomalous concepts for guilt[,]" id. at 59 (citing R.J.R. Blair et al., Emotion Attributions in the
Psychopath, in 19 PERSONALrrY AND INDIVIDuAL DIFFERENCES 431-37 (1995)).
121. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1511, 1525
(1992) (including among the capacities for moral agency "the ability to engage in moral
evaluation of one's character and acts").
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learning that others do not view them as having good and trustworthy
characters. Take, for instance, Cleckley's account of his patient, Roberta, a
woman with a significant history of theft and deceiving others for money and
whose father stated about her: "It's not that she seems bad or exactly that she
means to do wrong. She can lie with the straightest face, and after she's
found in the most outlandish lies she still seems perfectly easy in her own
mind." 122 After discharge from Cleckley's care, Roberta, despite knowing
that Cleckley was informed of her most recent crimes, would send requests
to him for letters of recommendation for job applications. 12 3 Employers, on
Roberta's request, would send forms asking whether Roberta possessed
"good character" and "high moral standards;" whether her reference would
employ her in a position requiring "considerable responsibility."' 124 Cleckley
wrote, "Roberta seemed sweetly free of any doubt that such
recommendations would be given without qualification and in the highest
terms of assurance."' 125 Roberta's ignorance of the kinds of behavior that
have moral significance to us provide good reason to conclude that she does
not have the power to grasp and understand moral considerations.
V. PSYCHOPATHS' DIMINISHED CAPACITY
FOR RATIONAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
A. Weak Capacity to Possess Evaluative Standards
In this Part, I discuss evidence that the psychopath's diminished capacity
for moral reasoning is symptomatic of a more general diminished capacity
for rational self-governance. It is not merely that the psychopath has not
internalized any moral standards; he has a weakened capacity for possessing
any kind of evaluative standards, and that weakened capacity is related to
122. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 47.
123. Id. at 55.
124. Id.
125. Id. Cleckley's patient, Chester, exhibited the same kind of moral ignorance as
Roberta. While in jail, Chester was able to continually convince his psychiatrists that he was
fit for parole by promising to turn his life around. Id. at 132. Repeatedly, shortly after being
released on parole, Chester would find a way to land himself back in jail. Id. Then, upon
meeting with Cleckley, Chester would demand to be released on parole again, arguing that he
had proven himself to be a trustworthy and reliable person. Id. He repeated, "You know that
I'm a man of my word." Id. Cleckley states that after asking Chester how he could think that
Cleckley could perceive him as trustworthy and reliable after breaking his word so many
times, Chester "showed no sign of being confounded." Id. He did not understand Cleckley's
basis for doubt.
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signs of irrationality, discussed below. Individuals with psychopathy may not
exhibit the kind of disordered thinking prevalent in persons with psychoses,
but agents can be irrational in other ways. Young children are not responsible
due to their lack of rational powers, and in may ways, persons with
psychopathy are similar.
Though I hypothesize that psychopaths have a diminished capacity for
rational self-governance due, at least in part, to a diminished capacity for
possessing evaluative standards, let us first examine why one might argue
that psychopaths do, in fact, possess evaluative standards. It might seem
quite obvious that psychopaths do care about something: they certainly
pursue excitement and pleasure, 26 and thus psychopaths must care about
them. They must deem excitement and pleasure to be the most important
worthwhile goals in life, while boredom and pain must be avoided.
127
Indeed, their actions in pursuit of excitement and pleasure, including
their repetitive immoralities towards those ends, are not unintelligible to us
in the same way that, say, a mere desire to place green books all over one's
roof is unintelligible. 28 We can see how deceiving and manipulating others
can be very exciting, and presumably, we do think that excitement and
pleasure are good things. If psychopathic individuals lie and deceive their
guardians, psychologists, and judges, it is only to stay out of trouble so that
they may freely pursue excitement and pleasure, what they value. They may
not be the deepest folks, but shallowness does not imply a lack of evaluative
standards or irrationality.
Such an argument would point in favor of concluding that the
psychopath is a rational agent who should be held morally responsible.
Maybe he is, in fact, capable of grasping moral claims, and only rejects them
because moral claims interfere with the pursuit of what is truly valuable,
namely, excitement and pleasure. If this were true, then the psychopath's
126. See HARE, supra note 58, at 58, 61.
127. In criticizing arguments for the conclusion that psychopaths are non-responsible
agents, Vinit Haksar assumes that the psychopath does have values that we can discern by
observing the psychopath's behavior. Haksar, supra note 2, 141-42. To illustrate, in response
to the claim that the psychopath's criminal acts frustrate his own valued end of remaining free,
Haksar suggests that, perhaps, the psychopath simply values committing criminal acts more
than he values remaining free. Id. at 141.
128. This example is from G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 26 (Harvard Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2000) (1957). Anscombe argues that if someone were to cover his roof with green books
but only answered the question "Why?" with an answer like, "No particular reason" or "I just
had the desire to," then his "words would be unintelligible unless as joking and mystification."
Id. at 26-27. As such, we would not see the agent's behavior as intentional; we would not be
able to "make out what the man meant" by giving such a response. Id. at 27.
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mimicking of moral argumentation would be intelligible to us: his intelligible
purpose would be to remain free to pursue worthwhile goals.
However, I think it is more plausible to conclude that psychopathic
individuals have no evaluative standards, not even ones related to the pursuit
of excitement and pleasure. There is an important distinction between
desiring and valuing; 129 or rather, a difference between efforts to satisfy
desires and efforts to live up to evaluative standards. As discussed, normal
human agents do not merely act on their strongest first-order desires and try
to determine ways to make their first-order desires compossible.130 We have
the capacity to reflect on the worth of our desires, possibly concluding that
some of our desires do not provide any reason for action at all, precisely
because they move us toward action that would violate our evaluative
standards. A parent may experience a desire to strike or scream at a toddler,
but resist because she knows that there is not good reason to do so.13
1
Frankfurt's well-known contrast of the willing and unwilling addicts
illustrates the distinction between merely desiring and holding oneself to
evaluative standards.132 Both agents experience recurrent first-order desires
to inject themselves with heroin. The willing addict often refrains, but not
because he thinks giving in to the desire is base or wrong or otherwise
unworthy of satisfying.3  When he does give in, his decision has nothing to
do with a view about what is important. He is not, say, taking the heroin
because he thinks it helps him achieve a higher state of consciousness in
which he gains insight into the world or becomes more artistic. He is, in
Frankfurt's terms, a wanton, because he is indifferent to his experience of his
first-order desires. 134 If he experiences the desire to inject, he attempts to
satisfy it unless he has some other first-order desire that is stronger and
would be frustrated if he were to take the heroin. The unwilling addict,
however, struggles with his desire not simply because he has a conflicting
first-order desire not to take heroin, but because he also thinks that it is, say,
base or shameful or wasteful to spend his life in a drug-induced state of
mind. 35 He is not indifferent to his experience of his first-order desires, but
rather reflects on their desirability in light of what he takes to be important,
the standards to which he holds himself.
129. Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL 337, 338 (Gary Watson ed., 2003).
130. Taylor, supra note 14, at 282.
131. Watson, supra note 129, at 342.
132. Frankfurt, supra note 13, at 11-25.
133. Id. at 19-20.
134. Id. at 11, 19-20.
135. Id. at 12-13; see also Taylor, supra note 14, at 281-85.
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Psychopathic individuals, depicted in the psychological literature,
resemble Frankfurt's wanton. They seem to desire and, thus, pursue
excitement and pleasure, but not have evaluative standards. The key
evidence for this conclusion is the psychopath's thorough immunity from
feelings of regret, remorse, shame, and guilt. 36 The empirical accounts of
psychopaths emphasize their unfamiliarity with these emotions. 37 We
experience these feelings when we fail to act on or miss the reasons we have
to act in certain ways required by the standards to which we hold ourselves.
If you care about your friend, you have reasons to be loyal, to be concerned
with her interests and to stay in touch. 38 If you fail to act on these kinds of
reasons at appropriate times without excuse or justification, you regret or
have remorse for the failure.
These kinds of emotions are not restricted to the violation of moral
standards. If you hold yourself to standards regarding good musicianship,
you are prone to reactive attitudes that entail negative self-evaluation when
you do not live up to those standards. 139 It is impossible to be completely
immune to these reactive attitudes if you are an agent who holds herself to
evaluative standards. Well, perhaps a flawless agent who never frustrates her
own ends might be unfamiliar with such attitudes; but we do not have to
worry about that possibility. As will be discussed further below, the
psychopath frustrates his own ends.
One might point out that psychopaths feel and express frustration and
anger-sometimes through violence-when they fail to satisfy their desires
or when they are caught by the police for a criminal offense. From this fact,
136. See HARE, supra note 58, at 44, 53 (describing psychopaths as "emotionless
androids" with "proto emotions").
137. See, e.g., BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 7-11; CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 343.
In his article on psychopaths and responsibility, Haksar assumes that psychopaths do have
values and, specifically, that they might value their criminal acts more than they value their
freedom. Haksar, supra note 2, at 141. To support his claim, Haksar asks: "If [the psychopath]
did really value his liberty, job, etc., so much more than he values the committing of anti-
social actions, shouldn't he have shown regret after he throws them away, and show some
desire to change things in the future?" Id. Here, Haksar agrees that having values implies
being prone to self-directed reactive attitudes like regret. However, in defending the
possibility that psychopaths may be held morally responsible for their behavior, Haksar
ignores the possibility that the psychopath fails to feel regret when throwing away his freedom
because the psychopath is incapable of feeling regret, in conjunction with being incapable of
holding himself to any evaluative standards.
138. SCANLON, supra note 3, at 88.
139. See WALLACE, supra note 2, at 33-40 (discussing that reactive attitudes, such as
resentment and indignation, can be moral or non-moral, depending upon the nature of the
underlying belief that gives rise to one's particular experience of the attitude).
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one might conclude that individuals with psychopathy do value satisfying
their desires. However, there is a significant difference between feeling
frustration and anger per se, on the one hand, and experiencing reactive
emotions, such as remorse and shame, to which we are prone in virtue of
holding ourselves to evaluative standards. Frustration does not entail
negative self-evaluation or the deeper sense of loss associated with engaging
in conduct that violates what one stands for.
The criminologists William McCord and Joan McCord reference this
connection between self-directed reactive emotions and holding oneself to
standards when distinguishing the psychopathic offender from other
criminals: "[The psychopath's] guiltlessness ... is the critical distinguishing
trait. The normal criminal has an internalized, albeit warped, set of values. If
he violates these standards, he feels guilt."'14 The psychopath, on the other
hand, shows no signs of standards or self-evaluation. 141
Cleckley also describes in this manner and in more detail one of his
subjects with psychopathy, Max:
He is unfamiliar with the primary facts or data of what might be called
personal values and is altogether incapable of understanding such matters. It
is impossible for him to take even a slight interest in the tragedy or joy or the
striving of humanity as presented in serious literature or art. He is also
indifferent to all these matters in life itself. Beauty and ugliness, except in a
very superficial sense, goodness, evil, love, horror, and humor have no actual
meaning, no power to move him.
He is, furthermore, lacking in the ability to see that others are moved. It is
though he were colorblind, despite his sharp intelligence, to this aspect of
human existence. It cannot be explained to him because there is nothing in
his orbit of awareness that can bridge the gap with comparison. He can
140. WILLIAM MCCORD & JOAN McCoRD, THE PSYCHOPATH: AN ESSAY ON THE
CIUMINAL MIND 51 (1964). In the beginning of their book on the psychopath, Blair and
colleagues introduce the reader to two different, adult criminal offenders who are
fictionalized, but are "amalgamations of individuals with whom [they] have worked." BLAIR
ET AL., supra note 61, at 1. Only one of these individuals presents with a psychopathic
personality. Blair and colleagues describe the non-psychopathic offender as subject to guilt (in
this story, for cheating on his girlfriend), while the psychopathic offender showed no signs of
accepting responsibility for violating any social, legal, or any other kind of rule. Id. at 4-6.
141. "A psychopath is not a rebel, who rejects more conventional values and emotions
in the light of some favoured conception of the good: he is a man who has never come to
understand, or to share in, this dimension of human life." Duff, supra note 2, at 192.
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repeat the words and say glibly that he understands, and there is no way for
him to realize that he does not understand. 14
2
Hare provides a similar description, stating that, "[u]nlike most other
criminals, psychopaths show no loyalty to groups, codes, or principles, other
than to 'look out for number one. '" 143 Unsurprisingly, then, the psychopath's
lifestyle is "chronically unstable and aimless[;]"' 44 they "tend to live day-to-
day and to change their plans frequently[;]' 145 and do not "show much
concern about how little they have done with their lives."'
1
B. Signs of Diminished Capacity for Rational Self-Governance
Generally, the psychopath's incapacity for holding himself to evaluative
standards renders much of his behavior unintelligible to us. Researchers
convey self-descriptions that psychopathic subjects offered of themselves,
and they are irrational, simply baffling. First, Hare reports psychopathic
individuals making claims about valuing certain projects or people, or having
certain goals, but their behavior in light of such claims is unintelligible. Their
behavior demonstrates that they do not really understand their own claims
regarding what they care about. To illustrate, a common story involves a
psychopath's insistent claim to care deeply about another person, yet her
behavior shows that she does not understand that claim. Hare tells one
story-which he characterizes as typical-about one of his subjects whose
infant was removed by authorities from her guardianship. Hare describes her
as not seeing any tension between her claim that the child benefitted from her
love and affection and the fact that the child was found severely
malnourished.
147
Another one of Hare's patients, asked whether he had any character
weaknesses, replied, "I don't have any weaknesses, except maybe I'm too
caring."'148 There would be no reason to conclude that this inmate (convicted
of rape, robbery, fraud, and other crimes) was irrational if he made this claim
knowing that others would not find it credible. But if, as Hare intimates, this
142. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 40; see also HARE, supra note 58, at 27-28 (quoting
CLECKLEY, supra).
143. HARE, supra note 58, at 85.
144. Id. at 57.
145. Id. at 59.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id. at 38.
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inmate believed what he was saying or, at least, did not have a clue that
others would see it as incredible, we have evidence of a diminished capacity
for rationality. This individual with psychopathy might not be out of touch
with physical reality, but he makes claims that are crazy due to his
unfamiliarity with the social world. "[I]magining the world as the psychopath
experiences it is close to impossible."1 49
Hare reports that individuals with psychopathy often express that they
have goals, but show that they do not understand what is entailed by having
such a goal and how to achieve it: 50
The psychopathic inmate thinking about parole might outline vague plans to
become a property tycoon or a lawyer for the poor. One inmate, not
particularly literate, managed to copyright the title of a book he was planning
to write about himself and was already counting the fortune his bestseller
would bring.
151
If individuals regularly make claims about what they will do in the future,
yet there is no connection at all between these claims and what they actually
do (and it is apparent to everyone but such agents that there is no connection
between these expressed plans and subsequent actions), we have reason to
see such agents as having a diminished capacity for rational self-governance.
Cleckley, too, observed that individuals with psychopathy do not
consistently follow life plans.152 Part of the explanation for this characteristic
also supports viewing these individuals as less than adequately rational: they
have a diminished capacity for resisting impulses and the urge to satisfy a
present desire in favor of long-term plans, both those professed by the
individual and which he should have, given his complete set of desires. As
such, they appear to have a diminished capacity for appreciating prudential
reasons, especially those associated with their long-term interests.
One of Cleckley's patients, Arnold, consistently expressed his desire to
live freely, not in prison or the hospital ward in which he was regularly
placed with psychotic individuals after each of his violations of the law.
Cleckley explains that Arnold's parole was continually granted, yet Arnold
would soon violate the terms of parole, frequently within hours of his release
149. Id. at 78.
150. Id. at 39.
151. Id.
152. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 364 ("The full psychopath shows a striking inability
to follow any sort of life plan consistently, whether it be one regarded as good or evil.").
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from hospital grounds.1 53 "Two or three small acts of defrauding, the
temporary misappropriation of an automobile (which he would usually
abandon after his whim for a ride had been fulfilled), or some other
succession of deeds incompatible with parole status always brought him back
under strict supervision."' 54 In describing the psychopathic personality in
general, Cleckley writes:
He throws away excellent opportunities to [achieve his professed ends] ...
that he has sometimes spent considerable effort toward gaining. It might be
said that he cares little about [these ends], but it is difficult indeed to say that
he is not extremely fain to get out of the psychiatric hospital where he has
been locked up for months with other patients whom he regards as "lunatics"
.... Be it noted again that the psychopath appears as unwilling to remain in
a psychiatric hospital and as impatient to regain his freedom as would be the
normal man. I have not in these patients ever found reliable evidence that
unconsciously they seek and enjoy as punishment such confinement.155
From his own experience, Hare conveys similar accounts 156 showing that
psychopaths have a weakened capacity to consider present desires in light of
their other desires and to respond to them in a rational manner. 1
57
This inability to resist temptation is perhaps one reason why the
recidivist rate for psychopaths is startling higher than that for non-
psychopathic offenders. According to a meta-analysis of existing data,
researchers found that "within a year of release, individuals with
psychopathy are three times more likely to recidivate, and four times more
likely to recidivate violently."'
158
It is not surprising that agents with a very weak capacity for internalizing
standards act on unevaluated whims and impulses. Hare writes that persons
acquainted with individuals with psychopathy "typically find themselves...
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id. at 58.
155. Id. at 345.
156. HARE, supra note 58, at 88; see also Jeannette Kennet, Do Psychopaths Really
Threaten Moral Rationalism? 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 69, 76-77 (2006) (citing Hare's example
in discussing the rational defects of individuals with psychopathy).
157. See Kennett, supra note 156, at 77 ("[T]hey display a remarkable incapacity to
keep track of their supposed ends, to consider whether and how their immediate wants give
rise to reasons, to order their wants, or to picture the consequences of their actions.").
158. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 16 (citing meta-analysis published in J.F.
Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism: A Review, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 139, 139 (1998)).
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asking ...what happened-jobs are quit, relationships broken off, plans
changed, houses ransacked, people hurt, often for what appears little more
than a whim.' 59
The fact that much of their behavior is based on whim leads to another
observation that signifies irrationality: much of their conduct appears
unintelligible to us, given that it is behavior that requires good reason.
16°
Let's return to Cleckley's account of twenty-year-old Roberta. She left her
parents' house one day, explaining to Cleckley that she intended to visit a
boyfriend, a soldier stationed in another state. She claimed that she thought
about marrying him, but according to Cleckley it appeared that "she was
moved by little more than what might make a person stroll off into the yard
to see if the magnolia tree had bloomed."'161 She eventually got off her bus at
a place in which she knew no one, where she had no purpose to visit. When
she reached the soldier by phone, he told her not to come. Though she
"thought" about marrying him, she was not upset by his rejection. 62 Roberta
decided to travel to another city, having "no distinct purpose in mind."
' 163
This episode was one on which Cleckley based his conclusion that it is
difficult to understand what Roberta's reasons for actions are. If she had
suffered from hallucinations (e.g., heard God's voice telling her what to do),
then her behavior "would, in a very important sense, be more rational and
appropriate."' 164
VI. REMARKS ON PSYCHOPATHY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
The principal aim of this Article has been to address a debate within the
moral responsibility literature regarding the characteristics of agents whom
we may fairly hold morally responsible, a debate that primarily implicates
159. HARE, supra note 58, at 58.
160. See Duff, supra note 2, at 193 ("[T]he absence of recognisably rational purposes
and values makes it difficult sometimes even to say that he acts, rather than that events and
acts happen to and through him.").
161. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 51.
162. Id. at 52
163. Id.
164. Id. at 53. For another example, see Cleckley's report concerning Joe. Id. at 146-
59. Joe randomly chose a train destination to travel to even though he expressed excitement
about accompanying his family on a vacation. On his journey, he found himself joining an
evangelist's mission, working to urge people to repent for their sins. He had no serious belief
in the religion, but, without explicating the reason, reported, "I just sold myself somehow on
the idea of doing it." Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). Eventually, he returned
home, but his erratic behavior and idle drifting continued. Id. at 155-56.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Rutgers L.J. 383 2007-2008
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
the responsibility status of individuals with psychopathy. Some compatibilist
theorists argue that the capacity for rational self-governance or practical
reasoning qualifies an agent to be held morally responsible, though other
compatibilists additionally require for moral responsibility a special capacity
for grasping distinctly moral reasons. I have attempted to deflate this debate
as far as possible by showing that the prime candidate for the area of
disagreement - the psychopath - is not a fully responsible agent on either
account of moral responsibility.
I have yet to address whether the criminal law should treat the
psychopath as criminally responsible, despite the conclusion that he is less
than fully morally blameworthy for wrongdoing. This issue of psychopathy
and criminal responsibility requires separate extensive treatment. In this
section, though, I will briefly discuss the relationship between current legal
standards of insanity to psychopathy, and then sketch some relevant
considerations about whether the criminal law should treat individuals with
psychopathy as responsible or not.
A. Psychopathy and Current Tests for Legal Insanity
Even if it is true that psychopaths have a diminished capacity for rational
self-governance or practical reasoning, psychopathy alone does not appear to
represent the kind of mental defect that normally disqualifies an individual
from being held criminally responsible. To see why, first note that insanity
tests narrowly focus on a subset of the necessary criteria for responsibility-
for-action, regarding specifics about a defendant's understanding of the
particular act in question. Insanity tests do not require a more general
assessment of a defendant's reasoning capacities. Consider the M'Naghten
test for insanity:
a person is insane if, at the time of her act, . . . she was laboring under such a
defect of reason ... that she (1) did not know the nature and quality of the
act that she was doing; or (2) if she did know it, she did not know that what
she was doing was wrong, i.e.[,] the accused.., did not know the difference
between right and wrong. 165
165. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 375 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing the test based on the standard from M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L.)).
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Neither this test nor the ALI's related version in the Model Penal Code
("MPC") captures all the relevant considerations for determining whether or
to what extent an agent should be held responsible for her actions. A ten-year
old may perfectly understand the nature of her acts and the difference
between right and wrong, yet, because of her immature rational capacities,
we do not think she should be held responsible for her acts to the same extent
that we hold normal functioning adults.
Let's now return to psychopathy. Arguably, an individual with
psychopathy is sane under the first prong of the M'Naghten test (unless he
suffers from some other condition that precludes knowing the nature of one's
act). Psychopaths are in touch with physical reality: they do not suffer from
psychosis, as do persons with schizophrenia. 166 And they know the general
nature of what they are doing. Indeed, they can have insight into other people
sufficient to con and manipulate them successfully. 1
67
On the other hand, one could argue that they cannot know the true nature
of their criminal conduct because their insight into the emotional experience
of other people is so feeble that they do not understand the real harmful
consequences of their actions. The second prong of the M'Naghten test
would be relevant here, as well. The psychopath can know that the law
punishes and society deems wrong certain kinds of actions, and in that sense
he "know[s] the difference between right and wrong." But one could argue
that "formal cognitive knowledge" of right and wrong is insufficient for
criminal responsibility; 16 one must also be able to "internalize the enormity
of [his] criminal act" and appreciate emotionally its moral wrongfulness.169
The case for excusing the psychopath along this rationale is stronger
under law that follows the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), or at least one
version of the MPC test. The MPC standard does not require knowledge of
the wrongful nature of one's act for responsibility, but rather excuses an
offender who lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or
wrongfulness of his conduct (depending upon whether the adopting state
legislature chooses the word "criminality" or "wrongfulness").170 If a law
requires substantial capacity to appreciate moral wrongfulness, the
166. CLECKLEY, supra note 88, at 339.
167. HARE, supra note 58, 46-5 1.
168. DRESSLER, supra note 165, at 375 (drawing a distinction between "formal
cognitive knowledge" of right and wrong and "affective knowledge").
169. Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:
Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial,
30 AM. J. CRiM. L. 315, 324 (2003); see also DRESSLER, supra note 165, at 375.
170. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) explanatory note (1985).
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psychopath has a strong argument for excuse. 171 The MPC does include an
exception, stating that the required "mental disease or defect" underlying an
offender's insanity plea cannot be satisfied by "an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.' 72 However, as
described earlier, psychopathy involves more than repetitive antisocial
behavior.
Regardless of how we interpret these cognitive tests for insanity,
ultimately the issue should be whether the reasons to hold the psychopath
criminally responsible are stronger than the reasons to excuse, or vice
versa.173 Do we have good reason to want our criminal responsibility
standards to excuse the psychopath, either through a particular interpretation
of insanity standards or via a separate excuse analogous to laws that exempt
young children from criminal liability ?
171. Christopher Slobogin argues that the psychopath is not insane under the
M'Naghten test, but that we would have to excuse them under a straightforward application of
the "wrongfulness" version of the MPC test. Slobogin, supra note 169, at 323-24.
172. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1985).
173. The MPC test also includes a volitional prong - based on what has become known
as the "irresistible impulse test" - modeled on laws that some states adopted in response to
criticism of the M'Naghten test's sole focus on cognitive functioning. Under irresistible
impulse tests, the psychopathic offender appears criminally responsible, despite his weakened
capacity to resist urges in light of his long-term interests. The irresistible impulse test has no
standard formulation, but generally, it deems a person insane if she lacked volitional control
over her actions (perhaps due to an uncontrollable impulse or urge). DRESSLER, supra note
165, at 378. Psychopaths do have volitional control over their conduct. HARE, supra note 58,
at 60. Their wills are effective: they act on their desires. Though they are very impulsive and
react overly aggressively to perceived insults, "when they 'blow their stack' it is as if they are
having a temper tantrum; they know exactly what they are doing. Their aggressive displays
are 'cold'; they lack the intense emotional arousal experienced by others when they lose their
temper." Id. (emphasis added). Commenting on their own and other empirical research, Blair
and colleagues report that psychopathic offenders experience weaker emotional responses,
compared to non-psychopathic offenders, to perceived threats. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at
49-50. The empirical evidence does not support the conclusion that psychopaths lack control
over what they do.
On a separate note, there is reason to doubt that the "irresistible impulse" test, or any
other volitional test, is necessary to supplement a cognitive test and should be part of the law.
"[V]irtually no one with a mental disorder has a volitional problem because people with
disorders are fully able to execute the intentions that their disordered thoughts, perceptions,
and desires may motivate." Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente
Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1094 (2007) (citing HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANNE FINGARETTE HASSE,
MENTAL DISABLITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 44-65 (1979)). For an argument that a
cognitive test can better deal with any plausible excuse made under a volitional test, see
Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1054-63
(2002).
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B. Should the Criminal Law Excuse the Psychopath?
Before exploring some relevant considerations, first note the limitations
of the arguments I presented concerning the responsibility-status of
psychopaths. Even if their rational capacities are diminished (to the extent
that they truly lack the capacity to grasp moral reasons), no argument
presented indicates the extent to which one must have the disorder in order to
be considered morally non-responsible. Remember that psychopathy is a
continuum concept and its diagnosis is not based on considerations relevant
to law. Mental health experts diagnose an individual with psychopathy when
he scores thirty or above on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised.174 The
arguments I have offered do not indicate where on the psychopathy
continuum an individual's rational or moral capacities are too diminished to
be fairly held morally or criminally responsible for wrongdoing. In fact, my
arguments do not show that any individual diagnosed with psychopathy is
not at all morally responsible for his conduct. Whether a psychopath's
rational and moral capacities are sufficient for criminal responsibility is a
separate question. In addition, my arguments regarding the psychopath's
diminished capacity for rational self-governance are based on generalizations
and individual vignettes from the psychological literature. More research
would be required to assist the construction of standards to guide a legal
inquiry into whether a particular defendant's psychopathic condition
represents an excusing condition. Presumably, the first practical concern with
the idea of excusing psychopaths would be the serious difficulty the system
would face in trying to distinguish who should be excused among those
diagnosed with psychopathy. With these caveats, let us turn to whether we
have more reason to treat psychopaths as criminally responsible instead of
excusing, even on the assumption that some of them do not have sufficient
rational capacities to be considered morally responsible for their conduct.
A retributivist, of course, views moral desert as a necessary condition (as
well as the justifying reason) for criminal punishment; 175 and a mixed
theorist could also endorse retributive desert as a necessary condition, even if
she views consequentialism as justifying the institution of punishment,
174. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 7.
175. For a most helpful discussion of the retributivist's justification for criminal
punishment, see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179-85 (Ferdinand Schoeman, ed., 1987); MICHAEL S.
MOORE, PLACING BLAME 104-10 (1997).
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itself.176 Both these theorists would reject a purely consequentialist analysis
of whether we should afford a legal excuse to the non-responsible. But non-
consequentialists need not believe at all in retributive desert to reach the
same conclusion. 177 For example, one might take the justifying aim of the
criminal law to be deterrence, yet argue that fairness (as opposed to moral
desert) limits the reach of the criminal law to those who have the rational
capacities required for a fair opportunity to avoid violating the criminal
law. 178 Under any of these approaches to punishment, each individual has a
right not to be punished if she was not a responsible agent at the time of her
crime.
Legally excusing individuals with psychopathy, though, carries troubling
implications. Some practical considerations represent reasons why it is not
time now to clarify the law to excuse individuals with psychopathy, and other
practical considerations likely will continue to speak against excusing them.
A first set of considerations regard whether better consequences would
result from punishing psychopaths or, in deeming at least some set of them
non-responsible, rendering them eligible for involuntary civil commitment
upon a showing of dangerousness. Civil commitment would seem to require
special segregated units as they would pose too great a danger to individuals
confined with different underlying disorders and diseases. Individuals with
psychopathy may present a danger to other inmates in prison, but they could
pose a greater threat to exploit the more vulnerable individuals civilly
confined with serious mental illness. Moreover, at present, no effective
treatment exists for psychopathy. Actually, not only is there no treatment, but
mental health treatment seems to increase recidivism rates among
psychopaths exhibiting the most severe emotional dysfunction. 179 Similarly,
individuals who satisfy only the antisocial conduct aspect of psychopathy
176. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 16 (1997) (assuming that "desert based on moral fault is at least a necessary
pre-condition for just punishment").
177. See, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, Punishment and the Rule of Law, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 257-71 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald Slye, eds., 1999),
reprinted in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 219-33 (2003) (presenting fairness as a moral limit on justified punishment
without invoking the idea of retributive desert).
178. See id. at 225-30.
179. In summarizing one international study, Blair and colleagues report that
individuals with highest scores on the emotional dysfunction scale "reoffended at higher rates
if they had been treated: 86 percent as opposed to 59 percent!" BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at
16 (citing Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the Predictive Validity of the P.C.L-R: An
International Perspective, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 623, 637 (2000)).
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reoffend at lower rates after participating in educational and vocational
training programs; however, psychopathic individuals with the most severe
emotional impairment were reconvicted at higher rates after participating in
such programs than similarly profiled individuals who did not participate.
80
On the other hand, excusing psychopaths, rendering them eligible for
indefinite civil commitment, may have positive benefits for preventing
crime, especially when they are young and their antisocial conduct is at its
height.' 81  The rules governing their confinement could possibly
accommodate the data on their recidivism rates, and also our knowledge
about their decreasing anti-social behavior over time. The emotional
dysfunction associated with psychopathy does not seem to dissipate, but
psychopaths tend to "age out" of the antisocial-conduct aspect of the
disorder.' 82 Nevertheless, though, there is a danger of over-diagnosis of
psychopathy if that diagnosis renders some offenders eligible for
indeterminate periods of civil commitment.
Moreover, public attitudes about responsibility and punishment represent
a worrisome concern if we were to excuse individuals with psychopathy. At
present, no reason exists to think legislators would clarify insanity statutes to
excuse psychopaths. But if judges were to read current insanity statutes as
authorizing an excuse for psychopathic offenders, then that could lead to
renewed public antagonism or outrage towards the insanity defense, itself.8 3
The unavailability of the insanity excuse represents injustice, and we must
180. Id.
181. If the purpose of detaining persons with psychopathy who violate the law is to
prevent future crime, then there may be great benefit to using the civil commitment system
rather than the criminal justice system, which supposedly targets retributive desert. Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114
HARv. L. REV. 1429 (2001). Paul Robinson argues that one reason why it is perverse to
invoke the guise of retributive justice to cloak measures that really aim to prevent future
danger is that such measures do not do a good job of preventing danger. For example, "three
strikes" laws really aim to prevent danger, although they are implemented within the criminal
justice system; but these laws often ensnare offenders only after "the natural forces of aging..
rein" in their antisocial conduct. Id. at 1451.
182. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 23.
183. The well-known insanity acquittal of John Hinckley, who shot President Reagan,
spurred a "state legislative backlash against the insanity defense in general and control [or
volitional] tests in particular." Morse & Hoffman, supra note 173, at 1092. Many states
eliminated volitional tests from their insanity standards, and five state legislatures abolished
their insanity defenses entirely. Id.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Rutgers L.J. 389 2007-2008
RUTGERS LA WJOURNAL
consider whether excusing psychopaths would undermine support for the
defense. 184
We must also consider the financial and other costs to the criminal
justice system in excusing individuals with psychopathy. Of course, there are
costs associated with making insanity an available defense for the few
defendants who arguably meet present standards of insanity. However, the
number of offenders who could possibly raise (although not necessarily with
success) a psychopathy-excuse defense is very high. Regarding prison
inmates in the United States, "estimates suggest that between 50 and 80
percent . . reach criteria for [Antisocial Personality Disorder].' 85 Further
studies conclude that fifteen to twenty-five percent of prison inmates meet
the criteria for psychopathy under Hare's Psychopathy Checklist-Revised.
186
The fact that so many criminal defendants would be able to litigate their
responsibility-status could carry more than financial cost: "The law wants to
reinforce societal assumptions that most of us are morally accountable actors
but [a psychopathy-excuse] would permit most criminal defendants to
challenge that expectation of accountability.' ' 187 Perhaps a psychopathy-
excuse should be limited to serious crimes, but if so, that would represent
another issue requiring consideration if the law were to provide such a
defense.
The social costs of excusing individuals with psychopathy may strongly
speak in favor of maintaining current practices of exposing them to
punishment. Again, though, consequentialist considerations would arguably
be irrelevant if it is unjust to treat psychopaths as fully responsible agents.
They would have a right not to be punished, or so the argument goes.
However, even if we accept a non-consequentialist limitation to whom
we may punish, the aforementioned pragmatic considerations may
nevertheless prevail. One plausible view, related to the conclusion that the
psychopath is not morally responsible for his conduct, is that the psychopath
does not possess the same array of rights that persons with a sense of justice
must be afforded. In a well-known article, Jeffrie Murphy argues that
184. Some commentators do not believe the insanity defense is required by justice. See
id. at 1115-32 (discussing arguments against the insanity defense and presenting a persuasive
response).
185. BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 19 (citing S.D. Hart & R.D. Hare, Psychopathy
and Antisocial Personality Disorder, 9 CURRENT Op. IN PSYCHIATRY 129 (1996)).
186. Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: A Clinical Construct Whose Time Has Come, 23
CRim. J. & BEHAV. 25, 26 (1996) (cited in BLAIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 19).
187. Arenella, supra note 121, at 1599 (speaking through a judge engaged in colloquy
with a hypothetical psychopath).
[Vol. 39:349
HeinOnline  -- 39 Rutgers L.J. 390 2007-2008
RESPONSIBILITY STATUS OF THE PSYCHOPATH
psychopaths do not have rights at all because they lack the human capacity-
and, apparently, the potential to have that same human capacity-that is
necessary for the existence of institutionally-recognized rights; namely, the
capacity to defer gratification of one's desires to treat others respectfully, on
grounds of fair reciprocity.' 88 An individual who lacks all capacity to respect
the rights of others "is in no position to claim rights for himself."' 89 That
conclusion, if correct, does not imply that we may treat psychopaths in any
manner desired; we can still act cruelly, wrongly toward them. But that
conclusion implies that we would not violate anyone's rights if, for
pragmatic reasons, we choose to continue treating psychopaths as criminally
responsible for violating the law.
In addition, individuals with psychopathy, themselves, may not, from
their own perspective, have good reason to object to being treated as
criminally responsible. As noted, being excused would not mean going free;
it could mean indefmite civil confinement, possibly worse than being sent to
prison for a defined period. Furthermore, though criminal punishment may
carry a communal expression of moral blame, differentiating it from civil
confinement, moral blame does not affect the interests of the psychopath.
The psychopath does not take responsibility for his actions and does not care
(except perhaps for instrumental reasons) whether any rift exists between
him and others who find him blameworthy. The rift exists: he neither has
meaningful interpersonal relationships nor is capable of participating in one,
and he does not understand our moral experience; as such, he does not grasp
the interpersonal significance of being morally blamed by others. Civil
commitment and prison represent the same harm to him: confinement.
On the whole, then, it may be that both individuals with and without
psychopathy have more reason to endorse a system of legal rules under
which the former are held criminally responsible for their criminal conduct.
Here I have merely tried to sketch some relevant considerations.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed a debate within the moral responsibility
literature regarding the characteristics of agents whom we may fairly hold
morally responsible, a debate that primarily implicates the responsibility
status of individuals with psychopathy. Some responsibility theorists argue
that morally accountable agents have the capacity for rational self-
188. Murphy, supra note 2, at 290-91.
189. Id. at 291.
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governance or, rather, the capacity for practical reasoning; other theorists
argue that, in addition to that capacity, morally responsible agents must have
the distinct capacity to grasp and be guided by moral reasons. The
psychopath seemingly falls within the area of disagreement between these
camps of responsibility theorists because he is normally described as an
agent capable of reasoning practically, but without the capacity to engage
with moral reasons. Essentially, I have questioned this description of the
psychopath. I have argued that there is not significant disagreement between
these two camps of theorists because the psychopath's incapacity for moral
reasoning is symptomatic of a more general, weakened capacity for rational
self-governance.
On either account of the criteria for moral responsibility, the psychopath
is not morally responsible or, at least, not fully morally responsible for his
wrongdoing and criminal conduct. Nevertheless, there may be stronger
reasons, from the perspective of both persons with and without psychopathy,
to maintain the status quo in which individuals with psychopathy are held
criminally responsible for their criminal wrongdoing. The issue of their
criminal responsibility requires further analysis, which will be more
informed in years to come as we learn more about the disorder.
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